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A B STR A C T
The transportation o f nuclear materials is on the increase.
Although nuclear shipments are only a very small fraction o f the
Nation’s hazardous materials shipments, they attract a great deal o f
public attention. Shipments o f spent nuclear fuel and nuclear wastes
are a particular concern.
One o f the many fears that people have about nuclear energy is
the possibility that a nuclear shipment might somehow go awry and
cause a serious public hazard. Primarily, they are worried that a
shipment o f spent reactor fuel or highly radioactive waste could be
involved in a serious rail or highway accident and dump its contents
all over the countryside.

Questions have arisen in numerous public hearings on nuclear
reactor operations with regard to the adequacy o f public safety in
the transportation o f nuclear materials to and from nuclear reactors
and fuel reprocessing plants. This paper presents a summarized
status report on the potential hazards o f shipping those nuclear
materials. Since there have been no serious releases o f nuclear
materials in transportation accidents during the 25-year life o f the
Atomic Energy Commission, the paper is based on a theoretical
analysis o f accident risks.
What Is Shipped?
Nuclear power will play an increasingly important role in
meeting the Nation’s energy requirements. As nuclear power
increases, the quantities o f nuclear materials which must be shipped
will also increase.

Is that really possible? How safe are those shipments? How
many are there? What do they look like? Are the packages tested?
These and other questions are answered in this paper. Since public
risk is the product o f the consequences o f an accident and its
probability, both aspects are presented so that each o f us can make
up his own mind whether the risk from nuclear shipments is
acceptable.

The operation o f nuclear power reactors will usually require the
transportation o f three different types o f materials to and from
reactor facilities. Unirradiated ( “ cold” or “ fresh” ) nuclear reactor
fuel elements are transported from fuel fabricators to the reactor.
Irradiated ( “ spent” ) fuel elements and nuclear wastes are shipped
from reactor facilities to fuel reprocessing plants and to disposal
sites. Also, the radioactive products o f the spent fuel reprocessing
plants consist primarily o f recycled nuclear fuel materials shipped to
fuel fabricators or processors and both high-level and low-level waste
shipped to disposal sites.

Introduction
We live in a world o f hazards. We are surrounded by threats to
our health, our welfare, and our economy. Amongst the many
hazards we face is the one involving the transportation o f hazardous
materials. One o f the hazardous materials with which we must
concern ourselves is nuclear material.

Other shipments o f radioactive materials are made in support o f
nuclear power plant operations. For example, uranium concentrate,
produced from uranium ore, is shipped from uranium milling plants
in the western United States to uranium conversion facilities for
conversion o f the uranium concentrate to uranium hexafluoride.
Uranium hexafluoride is shipped to one o f the Atomic Energy
Commission (AE C ) uranium enrichment facilities. The enriched
uranium hexafluoride is then shipped to other plants which convert
the material to uranium oxide which is then fabricated into fresh
reactor fuel elements.

Public safety in the transportation o f hazardous materials has
been the subject o f increasing emphasis. An article in the May 1970
issue o f the Reader’ s Digest stated, “ Transportation o f hazardous
materials on our roads, railroads, and waterways is a major and
growing problem. One o f every ten trucks rolling toward you on the
highway today carries explosives, flammables. or poison. 111

The Department o f Transportation (D O T) has estimated (2)
that there are nearly 1.000.000 packages o f nuclear materials
shipped each year. About 95 percent o f the shipments involve small
quantities o f nuclear isotopes for use in industry, medicine,
agriculture, and education. By comparison, the total number o f
shipments o f nuclear materials to and from nuclear power plants in
197| probably numbered only a few thousand. (31 By the year
2000. however, the numbers o f shipments to and from nuclear
power plants will probably increase by at least 100 and perhaps as
much as 1.000. (4]
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Shipments o f nuclear materials are not readily distinguishable
from shipments o f other hazardous materials being transported in
routine commerce. They look like ordinary shipments. They are
usually handled and loaded in an ordinary manner, using ordinary
freight handling equipment. They are transported on a worldwide
basis, like other shipments, in the cargo compartment o f an airplane,
in a closed trailer or railroad boxcar, on “ low boys” over highway,
or on heavy duty flatcards by rail.

In addition, the packages must provide adequate radiation
shielding to limit the radiation exposure to transportation workers
and the general public. For spent fuel, the package must have heat
dissipation characteristics to protect against overheating from
radioactive decay heat. For both fresh and spent fuel, package
design must also provide nuclear criticality safety under both normal
transportation and severe accident conditions.
Package designs are reviewed by the AEC prior to use in order
to verify the adequacy o f the design parameters. I f it appears that
the package will, in fact, meet the regulatory requirements, [7,8]
the AEC will issue a certificate o f approval for the package.

They are not readily distinguishable, but there is a difference.
Nuclear materials, like many other materials, have hazardous
p rop erties. These properties must be considered in the
transportation o f nuclear materials-considered from the viewpoints
o f possible radiation exposure to people, contamination o f property,
and overall effect on the environment. As a result o f the depth o f
research studies o f the hazards and experience in the handling o f
nuclear materials, their properties are better understood than the
hazardous properties o f most other hazardous materials being
transported in far greater volume.

Shipment Information
DOT regulations specify the type o f information which must
appear on bills o f lading and other shipping papers. Packages are
required to be labeled appropriately. Warning placards generally
must be placed on the transporting vehicle. This puts the carrier and
emergency personnel on notice that they are handling shipments o f
hazardous goods. It alerts them to the fact that applicable state and
local regulations and ordinances need to be followed.

The packaging requirements for nuclear materials are designed
to provide a high degree o f protection and safety for personnel and
materials, during both normal conditions o f transportation and
severe accidents.

Quality Assurance
The adequacy o f the package design can be compromised or
circumvented by errors which occur during fabrication, maintenance,
or use o f the package. The person loading and closing the package
could make errors. Perhaps one or more bolts could be left out or
not properly tightened; a gasket could be misplaced or omitted; a
brace or “ holddown” piece could be left off. The chances o f such
an error are limited because o f the procedures required by the
regulations for examination o f the package prior to each shipment,
including tests for leak tightness, where necessary. Redundancy o f
safety features on the package will reduce the consequences o f such
operational errors, should they occur.

Principles Of Nuclear Shipment Safety
Protection o f the public and the transportation workers from
radiation during the shipments o f nuclear fuel and waste is achieved
by a combination of limitations on both the contents (according to
the quantities and types of radioactivity) and the package design.
Because shipments move in routine commerce, and on conventional
transportation equipment, they are, therefore, subject to normal
transportation accident environments [5 ] just like other nuclear
cargo. The shipper has essentially no control over the likelihood o f
an accident involving his shipment. He does have control over the
consequences o f accidents by controlling the package design,
contents, and external radiation levels. Safety in transportation does
not depend upon special handling or special routing.

Use o f the wrong materials or errors in fabrication also could
result
in a package failing to function properly during
transportation. Adequate quality assurance programs increase the
likelihood that such errors would be detected and corrected, prior
to use. The regulations [8 ] impose certain quality assurance
requirements on package manufacturers. The shipper is required to
d eterm ine that each package meets the approved design
specifications.

In the transportation o f all types o f hazardous materials, there
is a difference between potential hazards and realized damage. For
hazardous materials, a system o f protection is used to reduce the
likelihood of the potential hazard from becoming a reality. A highly
developed and sophisticated system o f protection has evolved for
the transportation of nuclear materials. This system is based upon a
simple principle-if a package contains enough radioactivity ( “ Type
B” quantity) to present a significant risk o f injury or large property
loss if released, then the package ( “ Type B” package) must be
designed to retain its contents during severe transportation
accidents. [5,6) Lesser quantities ( “ Type A ” quantities) do not
require as much protection, but still must be packaged in high
quality “ Type A ” packaging. In addition, all packages (Type A and
B) are required to completely retain their contents during normal
conditions of transportation.

Types of Radioactive Waste
Different types o f radiation have different penetrating abilities.
For example, alpha particles have a very short range in air and
cannot even penetrate a piece o f paper; beta particles travel over a
larger distance, but can still be shielded completely by light,
low-density materials such as aluminum; gamma rays require thicker
or more dense shielding materials such as lead and steel. The chief
hazard to human beings from alpha materials would be from
deposition o f the materials within the body, so special care must be
taken in containment o f the alpha wastes. Beta-gamma wastes also
require maintenance o f container shielding.

The basic principles o f safety are translated into the Federal
Government regulations.

There are several different types o f materials which may be
found in nuclear wastes. Nuclear wastes which are shipped around
the country to various processing, storage, or burial sites fall into
three general categories: (1) low specific activity (L S A ) wastes; (2 )
high-level wastes; and (3 ) other wastes.

Government Regulations
The transportation o f nuclear materials is subject to the
regulations of both the DOT (7 J and the AEC. [8 ] The DOT
Hazardous Materials Regulations also provide for safety in shipment
o f other more routinely shipped hazardous materials- materia Is
which are flammable, unstable, poisonous, explosive, or corrosive.
The same basic safety standards governing shipments o f nuclear
materials in the United States are in worldwide use through the
regulations o f the International Atomic Energy Agency. (9 )

Low specific activity wastes are those which contain such low
concentrations or quantities o f radioactivity that they do not
present any significant environmental hazards. Even if they were
released from their packages in a transportation accident, they
would not present much hazard to the public.
other

Like any
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freight spilled at the scene of an accident, they would have to be
cleaned up because o f their nuisance value. Under U.S. and
international regulations, they require only normal industrial
packaging for shipment and require no special rail cars or other
transport vehicles. LSA wastes may include such things as residues
or solutions from chemical processing: building rubble, metal, wood,
and fabric scrap; glassware, paper, and plastic; solid or liquid plant
waste, sludges, and acids; and slightly contaminated equipment or
objects.

waste includes such things as irradiated reactor structural
components, heavily contaminated objects, concentrated solidified
sludges or evaporator bottoms, and nonrecoverable radioactive fuel
scrap. Because o f the presence o f considerable quantities o f nuclear
material, packages o f these materials must also be capable o f
resisting severe accident.
Package Integrity
Before a specific type o f Type A package is approved by the
AEC' for shipment of nuclear materials, it must be capable o f
withstanding, without leakage, a series o f “ torture test” which
produce damage conditions comparable to the actual damage a
package might encounter in a hypothetical severe transportation
accident. The accident damage test sequence specified in the DOT
and AEC regulations includes a 30-foot fall onto a solid unyielding
surface, followed by a 40-inch drop onto a 6-inch diameter piston,
followed by exposure for 30 minutes to a I475°F fire. A water
immersion test is also required.

Alpha wastes, high-level wastes, and other wastes contain
sufficiently laige amounts of radioactivity that they have a
significant potential for injury or property damage if released to the
environment during a transportation accident. For that reason, DOT
and AEC regulations require that they be packaged such that, even
in the event o f a severe transportation accident, there would be no
significant release o f radioactive materials outside o f the containers.
The packages (T yp e B packages) must then be strong enough to
withstand the types of impact and puncture forces and fire effects
which are often encountered in severe accidents.
High-level wastes are those solidified wastes from the
reprocessing of highly irradiated nuclear reactor fuels. These wastes
have such a high radioactive content o f long-lived isotopes that they
require long-term storage in isolation and essentially perpetual
surveillance of the storage sites. The radiation level is high enough
to produce considerable heat, and the material must be heavily
shielded. The most common type o f high-level waste shipments will
be the solidified (process) waste from the nuclear fuel reprocessing
plants. Only solid materials of this type will be shipped to waste
storage sites. Shipments o f high-level liquid wastes are not presently
allowed by the DOT, and are not practical due to problems in
designing safe containers for bulk shipment of such liquids.

This test sequence represents the type o f damage which might
occur to a package in a high-speed truck accident or train
derailment, causing the package to impact on a hard surface (such as
a bridge abutment) and then to smash through wreckage or onto
rocks, and then to be directly involved in a 2-4 hour cargo fire, and
then to roll down into a river! The regulations therefore offer a very
high degree of assurance that a package will not breach under severe
accident conditions.
A specific safety analysis report must be prepared for each
package type and evaluated by the AEC before use. Only if the
packaging has successfully passed such rigorous evaluations does the
DOT authorize its use. At present, there are several hundred
different types o f radioactive material package designs that have
been authorized, ranging in size from small packages weighing a few
pounds to massive casks weighing over 100 tons.

A lp h a
wastes usually consist o f materials which are
contaminated with alpha radiation emitters such as plutonium or
other transuranium nuclides. They have very low levels o f
penetrating gamma radiation and so do not require heavy shielding.
Alpha emitters have the potential for causing contamination o f
objects or people if released from their packages. If the amount of
nuclear material exceeds certain levels o f concentration, the alpha
wastes must be packaged in Type B packages, but o f a different
type than the very heavy high-level waste packages. The emphasis in
packagin g
for transportation is containment, with several
containment barriers provided in the packaging system.

Packaging Methods
Fresh Fuel. A "typical” package for a “ typical” [16J light water
reactor fuel is a cradle assembly consisting o f a rigid beam or
“ strongback” and a clamping assembly which holds a few fuel
elements firmly to the strongback. The strongback is shock-mounted
to a steel outer shell. Fresh fuel elements might also be shipped in
steel boxes which are positioned in an outer wooden box by a
cushioning material. These packages, also with a few fuel elements
inside, would be about 2 to 3 feet in diameter or cross section, and
about 17 feet long. They would weigh from 1.000 to 9.000 pounds.
Typical containers are shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Other wastes are predominantly o f the beta-gamma type (e.g.,
fission product, industrial isotopes) which usually requires some
shielding material as a part o f the package. This waste may also be a
combination o f LSA. alpha, and beta-gamma types. Beta-gamma

OUTER WOODEN BOX
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FIGURE 2
PWR FUEL ELEMENT SHIPPING CONTAINER
Spent Fuel. Because irradiated fuel elements are highly radioactive,
their containers must be very heavily shielded. A typical “ cask”
used for shipping spent fuel would weigh between 20 and 75 tons.
It would be constructed o f thick steel walls filled with a dense
shielding material such as lead, tungsten, or depleted uranium. Each
cask would carry 1-7 PWR elements, or 2-18 BWR elements. The
casks would be generally cylindrical in shape, and perhaps 5 feet in
diameter and 15 to 18 feet long. A recently designed cask o f this
type is shown in Figures 3 and 4.

[

12]

High-Level Nuclear Waste. At the present time, the AEC is planning
on long-term storage o f all high-level wastes from commercial fuel
reprocessing plants at a Federal waste repository or engineered
storage facility. Some intermediate level fission product wastes may
be further treated for separation into high-level and low-level
components, the former of which would be destined for shipment
to a Federal storage facility, and the latter for shipment to
commercial burial facilities.
Shipping containers for high-level waste shipments will be very
similar in their basic design to the shielded casks routinely used to
ship spent fuel assemblies from a nuclear power plant to a fuel

IMPACT FINS

URANIUM SHIELDING MATERIAL
CLOSURE HEAD

IMPACT FINS

2 tons
3.7 tons

the cooling. In other casks, heat exchanges with cooling coils
running into the body o f the cask literally pumps the heat out and
into the atmosphere. Reliable, redundant systems are used where
such mechanical systems are relied upon to ensure adequate cooling.

The cask must not only provide radiation shielding, but must
also provide the means to dissipate the large amount o f heat
(perhaps 75,000 BTU/hr) produced by radioactive decay. Water is
usually used in the central cavity as a heat medium or primary
coolant to transfer the decay heat from the fuel elements to the
body o f the cask. The heat is usually dissipated by natural processes
to the air through fins on the surface o f the cask. For some o f the
larger casks, air may be forced over the fins by blowers to increase
VALVE BOX

empty
loaded

REMOVABLE CONTENTS

FIGURE 3
SHIPPING CASK
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CORRUGATED STAINLESS
STEEL OUTER JACKET

TIPPIN G C RAOLEi

RETRACTABLE ENCLOSURE

(MOVEABLE C O O LIN G DUCT

FIXED ENCLOSURE

Approximate weight of cask
and shipping assembly:
empty
loaded

70 tons
82 tons

FIXED COOLING OUCT

R E O U N O A N T ENGINE/BLOWER
COOLING S YS TEM

MOO TON C A P A C IT Y PLAT CAR

FIG U R E 4
IR R A D IA T E D FUEL CASK ON R A IL CAR

reprocessing site. Spent fuel is very similar in its overall shipping
characteristics to canisters o f high-level waste in that it is highly
radioactive and generates considerable heat. In both cases, the
shipping casks would be essentially the same type-large steel casks,
lined with lead, steel or uranium. The high-level waste actually will
be in a burial capsule or canister within the outer shielded cask. The
waste is inert, immobile, solid material which is nonexplosive,
noncombustible, and cannot turn to gaseous form and become
airborne. These high-level waste casks would be transported by rail
on conventional heavy duty flat cars. Highway load limits, rather
than safety reasons, will restrict highway shipments.

the solid alpha wastes to a storage facility. Other methods and
modes o f transportation may be used in the future.

No detailed cash designs have yet been submitted by industry
for AEC approval, since shipments to a storage facility will probably
not begin dptU the early 1980’ s. 118 ]

Fresh Fuel. Each year, on the average, about 1/3 to 1/5 o f the fuel
in a reactor is replaced with fresh fuel. Fresh fuel is usually shipped
by truck, with 6 to 16 packages per truck. About 6 truckloads o f
fresh fuel elements would be shipped to a reactor each year. For
100 reactors, that’s 600 truckloads per year nationwide.

Number of Shipments
Pattern of Shipments. Shipments would be nationwide, with the
predominance in the east. Reactor locations as o f Dec. 31. 1973. are
shown on Figure 5. Fuel processing plants are located in New York.
Illinois, and South Carolina. Fuel fabricators are scattered
throughout the east. Commercial waste burial sites are in New York.
Tennessee, Illinois, Nevada, Washington, and Kentucky.

Low-Level Nuclear Waste. Under the DOT regulations, (7 ] low level
solid waste is packaged depending on the amount o f radioactivity in
the package. Typically, the waste is solidified in a mixture of
vermiculite and cement in Type A steel drums. When filled, the
individual drums weigh between 500 and 800 pounds. If the drums
contain Type B quantities o f waste, the drums would require the
addition o f a Type B “ overpack” (i.e.. protective outer packaging)
to provide accident protection for the drums. Low specific activity
wastes or Type A quantities o f waste may be shipped in drums
without protective overpacks.

Spent Fuel. At present, all shipments o f spent fuel are made under
“ exclusive use” arrangement, by truck or rail. Some barge shipments
may be made in the future. There would be about 10 rail shipments
or 40 truck shipments annually from each reactor to a fuel
reprocessing plant. For 100 reactors, that’s 1.000 rail shipments or
4.000 truck shipments per year.
Radioactive Waste from Reactors. About 4.000 cubic feet o f low
level waste per year would be shipped from a BWR. and about
1.000 cubic feet per year from a PWR. Most o f the-shipments
would be made by truck. About 2.000 drums o f radioactive waste
would be shipped, with about 40 to 50 drums per truckload, for
about 45 truckloads per year for a BWR. For a PWR. there would
be about 500 drums and 10 truckloads per year.

Alpha Waste. Alpha waste is shipped either in a large accident proof
box or in a bundle o f 55-gallon drums encased in some sort o f outer
protective container to protect such materials from impact and fire.
Special railroad cars already constructed have been used to transport
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Assuming 100,000 truck miles per year of transportation for
each nuclear power plant, there would be about 0.09 injuries per
year and 0.005 deaths per year per reactor. Those deaths and
injuries would be from conventional or common causes not related
to the radioactive nature o f the cargo.

Radioactive Waste from Reprocessing Plants
High-Level Waste.
reprocessing plants
there will be about
shipments per year,

The first shipments o f high-level waste from
are not expected until about 1983. By 1985,
25 shipments a year. By 2000, there will be 260
for the three reprocessing plants. [18]

The nonnuclear property damage rate is about S2.000 per truck
accident. With 100.000 truck miles per year per reactor, this would
be an average loss o f about S300 per year per reactor due to
nonnuclear causes.

Low-Level Waste. Each reprocessing plant is expected to produce
about 20,000 cubic feet of low level waste per year. There would be
about 700 truckloads each year for three reprocessing plants.
Alpha Waste. Each reprocessing plant is expected to produce about
5,000 cubic feet of alpha waste per year. This would be about 30
rail carloads or 150 truckloads each year for three reprocessing
plants.

Rail Accidents. In 1969, the rail industry reported [14] about
8,500 accidents, 23,000 injuries, and 2,300 fatalities. The accident
rate for rail accidents was about 1.4 accidents per million car miles.
There were about 2.7 injuries per accident and about 0.27
deaths per accident. Assuming about 15,000 rail car miles per year
per reactor, there would be about 0.06 injuries and 0.006 deaths per
year per reactor, from conventional and common causes.

Accidents
Accidents occur in a range of frequency and severity. Most
accidents occur at low vehicle speeds, but the severity o f accidents
is greater at higher vehicle speeds. Most severe accidents generally
involve some combination ot impact, puncture, and fire effects.
Even if the hazardous nature ot the cargo is not a factor, accidents
often result in injury, death, and cargo or other property loss due to
common causes.

Nuclear Materials. To date, there have been no injuries or deaths o f
radiological nature due to the transportation o f nuclear materials.
[5] There have been a few cases o f truck drivers being killed or
injured as a result o f a collision or overturn o f vehicles carrying
nuclear materials. In none o f these cases, however, was there any
release of nuclear materials from Type B packages. [2]

Truck Accidents. In 1969, motor carriers reported [13] a total of
about 39,000 accidents, 20.000 injuries, and 1,500 deaths. The
injury rate is about 0.5 injuries per accident, and the death rate is
about 0.03 deaths per accident. The accident rate for hazardous
materials shipments was about 1.7 accidents per million truck miles.
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In recent years, DOT has recorded [ 2 ]an average o f 40 to 50
incidents per year involving the transportation of nuclear materials.
Almost all o f these incidents involved Type A or exempt packages.
In about 2/3 o f these cases, there was no nuclear material released

predicted likelihood o f serious leakage arising from accidents
involving packages o f nuclear materials to or from a nuclear power
plant in any one year is about one in five million. By comparison,
the likelihood o f serious injury due to an automobile accident per
person pier year is about one in 500.

from the packages. In a few percent o f the cases, there was
significant contamination requiring cleanup, with cleanup costs
running into the thousands o f dollars.
Accident Ride

The study [16]also shows that, in the transportation o f nuclear
materials, the probability o f injury or death due to common
accident causes is at least 100,000,000 times greater than the
probability o f injury or death due to radiological consequences.
Correspondingly, the total property and cleanup loss from
nonnuclear common causes in transportation accidents is expected
to be about $300, or about 2,500 times greater than the probable
losses from radiological contamination. The total expected average
loss from contamination in transportation per reactor year is about
12 cents.

Principle o f Risk. The significance o f radiological hazards during
transportation o f nuclear materials can be properly evaluated only
by considering together the consequences o f accidents and the
probabilities o f those accidents. One could compare the risks o f
transportation o f nuclear materials in several ways. For example,
one might compare the probabilities o f shipment accidents; 115,1 61
one might compare the average cost o f accidents by each mode o f
transportation; one might compare direct transportation costs, which
includes insurance premiums. However, all o f these partial measures
for comparing risk may be combined into a single contingency risk
cost factor which is the product o f the probability o f experiencing
an accident involving nuclear materials and the probable cost o f
such an accident if it occurs. In late 1972, the AEC completed a
study [ 17 ] of this type o f comparison for nuclear reactor power
plant transportation.

Conclusion

On the basis o f the studies referred to, it appears that the
probability o f death, injury, or massive property loss due to
transportation o f radioactive materials is (1 ) determinable, (2 ) not
zero, and (3) very small. In projecting the total accident probability
fo r transportation o f radioactive materials to and from nuclear
power plants, it seems obvious that the radiological consequences o f
the total accident spectrum will be several orders o f magnitude
below the more common nonradiological causes. It further appears
that radiation doses to transportation workers and the general public
during the normal course o f transportation will be limited to a small
fraction o f the total permissible annual dose, and then only to an
extremely small segment o f the population. The various studies
show clearly that the likelihood o f a catastrophic nuclear transport
accident is so infinitesimal that, for all practical purposes, it can be
confidently said that one will never happen.

Accident Records. In estimating the radiation risk from accidents
involving shipments of nuclear materials to and from nuclear power
plants, one must consider: (1) the frequency and the severity o f
accidents; (2) the likelihood o f package damage or failure; (3) the
nature, amount, and consequences o f releases o f radioactivity during
an accident; and (4 ) the capacity o f coping with such releases.
The environmental effects [5 ] which might occur in transporting
nuclear fuel and solid wastes resulting from the operation o f a
“ typical” power reactor has been evaluated. [1 7 ]The risk analysis
covers transportation of: (1) fresh fuel from a fabrication plant to a
reactor by truck; (2 ) spent fuel from a reactor to a fuel reprocessing
plant by truck, rail or barge; and (3) solid wastes from a reactor to
a radioactive burial site by truck or rail. The range o f known
distances between various sites must be considered. Estimates may
be made o f radiation effects on the environment under normal
conditions o f transportation and for credible severe accidents. The
potential accidents may be analyzed in terms o f severity and
predicted damage, and the probable consequences
o f releases.
Finally, by combining the probabilities o f accidents with the
consequences, the overall risk o f transportation accidents may be
estimated.

The risk is small, but is it acceptable? And to whom? Modem
life confronts people with a multitude o f risks. We don’ t live in a
riskless society, nor could modern technological societies exist on
that basis. Each person has his own idea o f what risks are acceptable
to him. The public apparently judges the convenience o f air travel
to be worth the risk that results in 200 fatalities per year; the
convenience o f driving an automobile is considered worth much
higher levels o f risk. Some people are afraid o f airplanes but ride
motorcycles. Sometimes the public judgments are not especially
rational. About 49 million Americans continue to smoke cigarettes
despite the clear warning o f risk to their health printed on each
package. Others smoke heavily but take a vitamin pill every day to
stay healthy. Many people are afraid o f the potential hazards o f
nuclear power, but risk their necks every day in the hazardous
reality o f highway travel. Some say that risks which they choose to
accept are acceptable, but risks which others force on t)iem are not.
In each case, the acceptability is most likely to be based on
subjective emotional reactions-“ gut” feelings-rather than a logical
analysis o f accident data or other actual experience. Few o f us are
afraid o f being bitten by a venomous snake, or being attacked by a
rhinocerous, in the middle o f Washington. D.C.. but that probability
is also ( l ) determinable. (2 ) not zero, and (3 ) very small.

Normal Conditions. According to the AEC analysis, [ 17 J truck
drivers and freight handlers would normally receive an average o f
about 0.2 to 0.3 millirem per shipment o f fresh fuel. No member o f
the general public is likely to receive more than about 0.005
millirem per shipment. Most o f the general public's exposure would
be nonrepetitive in that no single member o f the general public
would be exposed to those dose levels more than a few times per
year. The most that any one member o f the general public might
get during a year would then be perhaps 0.01 millirem or about
1/50,000 o f his annual permissible exposure.
For spent fuel shipments and radioactive waste, each truck
driver could receive as much as 30 millirem per shipment. A few
members o f the general public could receive as much as one
millirem per shipment, or about 1/500 o f his annual permissible
exposure.
Accident Probabilities
A study o f accident probabilities (1 6 ) showed that the
frequency o f severe accidents for both truck and rail shipments is
about one for each one hundred million truck miles or rail car
miles. The probability of extremely severe accidents is about
100,000 times less. Considering the total number o f truck miles or
rail car miles involved per reactor and estimating the predicted
accident response o f packages, the study 116) shows that the
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Certainly laws and regulations themselves will not guarantee
risk-free transportation. We are all aware o f the potential risks in
nuclear matters if safety is not given the very close attention it
deserves. Transportation accidents and their potential effects on
shipping containers have been well studied. These studies continue.
It is precisely because o f this perceived risk that the AEC has always
inposed stringent and overlapping protective measures in their
concept o f “ defense in depth." However, one cannot claim
“ assurance” as an absolute. No safety system can nor should it be
expected to guarantee complete safety o f a few individuals who by
very exceptional circumstances, peculiar habits, unusual customs,
extreme deviations from the typical individual get into difficulties.

Even the normal industrial safety limits for a variety o f hazardous
stresses provide only reasonable protection for typical workers, and
no more than that.

b.

We tend to react to the problem o f risk by making choices
based on the magnitude o f the risk, as we perceive it, and the
benefits to be gained from accepting the risk.

c.

The National Academy of Sciences has stated, “ Whether we
regard a risk as acceptable or not depends on how avoidable it is,
and how it compares with the risks o f alternative options and those
normally accepted by industry.” As a result o f the studies which
have been done, it is the AEC’s opinion [1 8 ]tliat, with regard to
nuclear shipments:
a. We have enough facts and figures on the hazards to allow a
more objective evaluation o f the risk acceptability than we
might derive solely from “ gut” feelings.

d.

The risk o f public catastrophe has been eliminated by strict
standards, engineering design safety, and operational care.
Whatever the consequences o f an accident are, the public hazard
will be manageable, and the nuclear effects will be small
compared to the nonnuclear effects.
The long-term public burden o f not transporting nuclear
materials is likely to be higher than the risks o f carefully
controlled transportation, considering the various options
available.
The likelihood o f death, injury, or serious property damage
from the nuclear aspects o f nuclear transportation is thousands
o f times less than the likelihood o f death, injury, or serious
property damage from more common hazards, such as
automobile accidents, boating accidents, accidental poisoning,
gunshot wounds, fires, or even falls—all things which we can
control, but apparently have accepted as a way o f life without
much public support for reduction o f risk.

REFERENCES

1. Robinson, D., “ Danger! Hazardous
Reader’s Digest, May 1970.

Materials

in

Transit,”

11. Brobst, W. A., “ Tests on Transport Packaging for Radioactive
Materials,” IAEA/SM-147/18, Seminar on Test Requirements
for Packaging for the Transport o f Radioactive Materials,
Vienna, Austria, 1971.

2. Grella, A. W., “ Accident Experiences in the USA Involving
Type B Packaging,” IAEA/SM-147/19, Seminar on Test
Requirements for Packaging for the Transport o f Radioactive
Materials, Vienna, Austria, 1971.

12. Shappert, L. B., et al, A Guide for the Design, Fabrication, and
Operation o f Shipping Casks fo r Nuclear Applications.
ORNL-NSIC 68. Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and
Technical Information, Springfield, Virginia 22101, 1970.

3. Heinisch, R., Transportation o f Nuclear Fuel Material in the
United States, Nuclear Assurance Corporation, Atlanta, Georgia,
1970.

13. Federal Highway Administration, 1969 Accidents o f Large
M otor Carriers o f Property, Department o f Transportation, Dec.
1970.

4. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Siting o f Fuel Reprocessing
Plants and
Waste Management Facilities, ORNL-4451,
Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information,
Springfield. Virginia 22101, 1970.

14. Federal Railroad Administration, Summary and Analysis o f
Accidents on Railroads in the United States, Accident Bulletin,
No. 138, U.S. Department o f Transportation, Washington, D.C.,
1970.

5. Brobst, W. A., “ Transportation o f Radioactive Waste-Worth Its
Salt?’ Third International Symposium on Packaging and
Transportation o f Radioactive Materials, August 1971;
CONF-710801.
6. Gibson, R., The Safe
Pergamon Press, 1966.

Transport

of

Radioactive

15. Leimkuhler, F. F., Trucking o f Radioactive Materials Safety
versus Economy f o r Highway Transportation, The Johns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1963.

Material,
16. Brobst, W. A., “ The Probability o f Transportation Accidents,”
Department o f Defense Explosives Safety Seminar, November
10, 1972; available from Division o f Waste Management and
Transportation, USAEC, Washington, D.C. 20545.

7. Department o f Transportation, Hazardous Material Regulations,
Title 49. Code o f Federal Regulations. Parts 170-189.
8. Atomic Energy Commission; Packaging o f Radioactive Materials
fo r Transportation. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part
71.

17. A to m ic
Energy Commission, Environmental Survey o f
Transportation o f Radioactive Materials to and from Nuclear
Power Plants., USAEC, Directorate o f Regulatory Standards,
Washington, D.C., December 1972.

9. International Atomic Energy Agency, Regulations fo r the Safe
Transport o f Radioactive Materials, Safety Series No. 6, 1967.

18. Atomic Energy Commission, Everything You Always Wanted to
Know About Shipping High Level Nuclear Waste, September,
1973; W A S H -1264, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402 (SO.65).

10. International Atomic Energy Agency, Notes on Certain Aspects
o f the Regulations. Safety Series No. 7, 1961.

28

